Modelling and measuring the effects of public subsidies on business R&amp;D: theoretical and econometric issues by Giovanni Cerulli
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 3 /2008 
 
 
 
 
Modelling and measuring the effects  
of public subsidies on business R&D: 
theoretical and econometric issues 
Giovanni Cerulli 
CERIS-CNR, Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth 
Via dei Taurini 19, 00185 Rome, Italy 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT. It is the aim of this paper to review the principal econometric models used so 
far to measure the effect of government’s support to private R&D expenditure; in order to 
reach this task, we first present a basic theoretical framework to identify the effects of pub-
lic subsidies on business R&D, going on by extending it to the case of dynamic comple-
mentarities and presence of subsidy spillovers. The review of the econometric models, the 
core of the paper, starts from section 3. We first classify econometric models according to 
three dimensions: 1. structural (based on a system of equations) and non-structural (based 
on a reduced-form equation and, possibly, a counterfactual) models; 2. models using the 
subsidy variable in a continuous or in a binary form; and finally, 3. studies exploiting a 
cross-section versus a longitudinal (panel data) structure. The final part of the paper is an 
original contribution providing some guidelines to implement R&D policy evaluation in a 
dynamic subsidization setting.       
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INTRODUCTION 
n the last thirty years a great bulk of empirical evidence has put in evidence the essential role 
played by business R&D efforts in fostering technological change, innovation and economic 
growth. As a consequence, it is not surprising that governments of industrialized countries have 
been long since engaged in providing incentives for the enlargement of the national R&D outlay.  
Although the traditional “public good attribute” of knowledge seems still the most known and 
accepted justification for policy intervention, other “market failures” such as capital market 
imperfections, barriers to entry and exit, coordination failure and so on, seems produce an 
insufficient provision of private R&D effort. 
Even though policy interventions trying to promote firms’ R&D effort date back at least to the 
middle of the past century, only in recent years economists and econometricians have provided 
reliable scientific studies aimed at understanding the set of complex factors explaining the rationale 
for R&D subsidization, the functioning of firm R&D strategy and the techniques to measure 
incentives’ effectiveness: we believe, in fact, that these three elements needs to be increasingly 
understood to provide a sound basis for policy guidance in this field. 
It is the aim of this paper to review the principal econometric models used so far to measure the 
effect of government’s support to private R&D, by tacking into account also some crucial theoretical 
aspects. In order to reach this aim, we present in the next section a basic theoretical framework 
widely adopted in the literature to identify the effects of public subsidies on business R&D, trying to 
extend it to the case of dynamic complementarities in firm R&D strategy (section 1.1) and to the 
presence of subsidy spillovers (section 2.1). 
The review of the econometric models, the core of the paper, starts from section 3 (just after a 
brief introduction in section 2.2). We decide to classify econometric models roughly according to 
three dimensions: the first relies on the distinction between structural models (that is, models based 
on a system of equations) and non-structural or reduced-form models  (that is, models based on one 
equation and, in some cases, a counterfactual); the second dimension hinges on the distinction 
between models using the policy variable (i.e., the public R&D subsidy) in level or in a binary form 
(i.e., supported vs. non-supported status); the third dimension, finally, concerns the type of dataset 
exploited, basing our analysis on the distinction between studies exploiting a cross-section versus 
those having access to a longitudinal (panel data) structure.        
Section 3 and its subsections present methods based on structural models where the subsidy is 
known in levels; section 4 presents the “matching method” identified as a more “empirical-based” 
approach (compared to structural models) and particularly suitable when the subsidy policy takes a 
binary form; section 5 comes back to a structural model (the Heckman selection model) where, this 
time, the subsidy policy is a binary (rather than a continuous) variable; section 6 and its subsections, 
then, deal with the analysis of subsidy additionality in a longitudinal data setting (applicable both in 
case of binary and level subsidy), while section 6.2 will treat, more in depth, the important case of 
“dynamic subsidization”; finally, in section 7, some concluding remarks follow.   
1. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK TO IDENTIFY THE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC SUBSIDIES ON 
BUSINESS R&D 
The “measurement without theory” long-standing controversy of the econometric discipline seems to 
have found in the study of the effects of public subsidies on firm R&D expenditure an unexpected 
revival. The most of the works in this field, in fact, seems to have embraced the only purpose of 
measuring the presence or absence of “additionality” of public incentives by skipping, at least 
implicitly, the essential step of going into an explicit theoretical framework explaining this causal 
relation. 
David et al. (2000) and David and Hall (2000) denounced this attitude of the econometric 
literature and tried to provide more sound theoretical bases for the understanding of the effect of 
I 
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public subsidies on R&D private investment1.  
Their structural model identifies the optimal level of R&D investment as the point in which 
marginal rate of returns (MCC) and marginal capital costs associated to R&D investments are equal. 
This is, on the side of firms, a classical profit maximization strategy. The MRR curve derives from 
sorting R&D projects according to their internal rate of returns, as in a usual investment plan. This 
curve is a decreasing function of R&D expenditures, since firms will first implement projects with 
higher internal rate of returns and then those presenting lower rates. The MCC curve, instead, 
reflects opportunity costs of investment funds, at any level of R&D. This curve has an upward slope 
due to the assumption that, as soon as the number of projects to implement increases, firms have to 
shift from financing them by retained earnings to equity and/or debt funding (i.e., from internal to 
external and more costly sources)2.  
Obviously, both curves depend on a number of variables other than R&D expenditure that can 
move them either downward or upward. In fact, according to the David et al. (2000) structural model 
we can write: 
 
[1]      
( , )
( , )
MRR f R
MCC g R
=
=
X
Z
 
 
where X and Z are variables that shift accordingly the curves. In particular the X-variables contain 
some proxies of: 
1. technological opportunities; 
2. state of demand; 
3. appropriability conditions. 
Variables contained in Z depend instead on: 
1. technological policy tools; 
2. macroeconomic conditions; 
3. external costs of funds; 
4. venture capital availability. 
The technological policy tools depend in turn on tax treatment, public subsidies and public-private 
cost-sharing research projects activated by governmental procurement3.       
The equilibrium condition, MRR = MCC, provides the optimal level of firm R&D investment 
(that we label R*). In explicit form, in fact, it becomes: 
 
[2]      * ( , )R h= X Z . 
 
Provided that X and Z are all exogenous factors, equation [2] is the “reduced form” associated to the 
structural model [1]. 
 
                                                                    
1 In particular, they distinguish between contracts and grants, as they are different incentive tools on the side of 
the government. In what follows, nevertheless, we will focus primarily on grants, even if many conclusions can be 
also extended to contracts.  
2 Actually David et al. maintain that the MCC curve starts with a flat shape becoming increasing only later after a 
given threshold; this form of the MCC curve is due to the self-financing effect: firms first use retained earnings (flat 
part) and only after they run them out, they address to the debt and/or equity markets (increasing part). 
3 The distinction among these forms of subsidization is remarkable. In particular, the analysis of contracts differs 
substantially from that of grants. According to the works of Lichtenberg (1987) and David and Hall (2000) two main 
elements contribute to the occurrence of additionality/crowding-out effects in the case of contracts: the first relies on 
the research inputs price increase due to changes in the labour demand for scientists and engineers activated by the 
contract (especially when the researchers’ total supply is assumed to be fixed and the government is budget-
constrained); the second is drawn upon spillover effects generated by contracts especially when they are the bases for 
future (expected) contracts and/or when they envisage to sell products to the government at the end of the R&D 
program. Both these causes can bring about additionality as well as crowding-out, even if the first of them (labour 
market effects) seems more likely to provide ground for crowding-out, while the second (spillover effects) for 
potential additionality (for a formal model see David and Hall, 2000).   
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FIGURE 1.  SUBSIDY EFFECTIVENESS ON BUSINESS R&D EFFORT ACCORDING  
TO DIFFERENT SHAPES OF THE MCC AND MRR SCHEDULES (PART I) 
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FIGURE 2. SUBSIDY EFFECTIVENESS ON BUSINESS R&D EFFORT ACCORDING  
TO DIFFERENT SHAPES OF THE MCC AND MRR SCHEDULES (PART II) 
 
 
According to this framework we can ask for what kind of effect a subsidy would have to the 
equilibrium level of the R&D expenditure R*. If we indicate the amount of subsidy with the letter S 
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and with H the incremental R&D expenditure activated by the subsidy S, we can observe that: 
 
[3]      *R R H= + , 
 
so that we can outline the following five cases: 
1. H = S: no additionality, nor crowding-out occurs; 
2. H > S: additionality occurs; 
3. 0 < H < S: crowding-out takes place; 
4. H = 0: full crowding-out occurs; 
5. H < 0 < S: more than full crowding-out takes place. 
 
Each of these possibilities can arise according to the following different settings, whose graphical 
representation is reported in figures 1 an 2. 
 
Setting (a): the firm is asset-constrained so that it operates with a perfectly vertical MCC schedule. 
In this case, ceteris paribus, the MCC schedule moves to the right augmenting the level of R&D 
outlays exactly of the same amount of the subsidy S (see graph (a) in figure 1). Note that 
independently of the MRR schedule’s shape the level of H coincides with S. This implies no 
additionality, nor crowding-out (case 1).  
 
Setting (b): the firm faces an upward sloping MCC schedule. In this case the level of R&D 
expenditure after the subsidy can increase depending on the slope of the downward sloping MCC: in 
the case (b1) of figure 1 we have that S = H (case1: no additionality, nor crowding-out); in the graph 
(b2) we get that H > S (case2: additionality); finally, in the graph (b3) we obtain that H < S (case 3: 
crowding-out). 
 
Setting (c):  the firm MCC is infinitely elastic (horizontal). According to the shape of the MRR 
schedule, again, we can have (following figure 2) no additionality, nor crowding-out (c1), crowding-
out (c2) and, finally, additionality (c3).  
 
Setting (d): the firm copes with a vertical MRR schedule (see figure 2, graph (d)). In this case H = 0 
< S and full displacement of the public subsidy occurs, independently of the MCC schedule’s shape 
(case 4). 
1.1 Dynamic complementarities  
So far we have assumed that movements of the MCC schedule induced by subsidy provision are 
independent of potential correlated movements of the MRR. Nevertheless, suppose as example that 
the subsidies allow the firm to improve its technological opportunities because, for instance, some 
fixed costs can be now more easily overcome. In this case, even in static absence of additionality 
such as, say, the case (b3) in figure 1, the firm would be likely to reach an higher than S additional 
R&D expenditure. The graph (e) in figure 3 shows this occurrence: after the subsidy injection the 
new equilibrium is in R* + H1 as in graph (b3) where H1 < S (we are moving along the MRR1 
schedule); the subsidy, however, could produce new technological opportunities that increase the 
number of R&D projects that become more profitable: in that case, also the MCC schedule will 
move to the right allowing to reach a new (long-run) equilibrium R* + H2 where H2 > S and where, 
therefore, there is additionality.     
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 3 /2008 
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FIGURE 3. DYNAMIC COMPLEMENTARITIES BETWEEN THE MRR AND MCC SCHEDULES 
ACTIVATED BY THE PUBLIC SUBSIDY 
 
From a theoretical point of view also the opposite case would be possible. Suppose to be in the 
case (c3) where additionality is fully reached (H > S). If we assume that the subsidy, for some 
unexpected reason, reduces the state of demand4 (moving the MRR schedule to the left) the new 
equilibrium could be characterized by an H < S, determining in so doing a crowding-out result (see, 
the graph (f) where, at the end, H2 < S).  
The last, didactic case, could be the possibility the subsidy generates a “more than full crowding-
out”. In this case the correlated leftward movement of the MRR schedule would be so strong to 
generate a situation in which H < 0 < S (case 5). Graph (g) shows this potential, even if little 
realistic, event.      
In conclusion: many different situations can arise where different subsidy effects can be produced. 
Crowding-out, as well as additionality are both consistent with the framework represented above. 
Clearly a reduced form such as equation [2], can only put in evidence the “net effect” of the various 
MCC and MRR movements without ascertain which of them has been changing. Many econometric 
works start by adopting equation [2], without specifying the structural model laying below it5.     
                                                                    
4 This occurrence is not so unlikely as it might seem. Indeed, suppose to have two complementary technologies: A 
and B whose combination is needed in order to get a given finished product. Suppose, then, that the government is 
budget-constrained and that, for some myopic strategy, is deciding to fund only research on technology A by 
excluding technology B from grants. In this case, firms producing technology A could have very pessimistic 
foresights about the future level of demand for the finished product, since they can expect the quality of the good to 
be too low for future customers’ tastes. Beyond some extent, this event can discourage those firms to engage in 
programmed R&D efforts producing some (previously unexpected) crowding-out effects.    
5 As we will clarify later, this is the approach followed by scholars using “matching methods” to R&D policy 
evaluation. 
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2. THE RATIONALE FOR R&D SUBSIDIZATION   
What is the rationale for R&D subsidization? Neoclassical theory based on a positive externality 
argument suggests that, because of the public good characteristics of the R&D activity, the level of 
private R&D expenditure would be systematically lower than the socially optimal level (Arrow, 
1962). This occurs since the benefits associated to R&D activities are easily and freely available to 
subjects that are not engaged in R&D efforts6. Indeed, the lack of full appropriability of R&D 
outcomes reduces the incentive to do R&D on the side of private for-profit firms so that, as in a 
classical Pigouvian context, a government intervention through subsidization can reduce the extent 
of this “market failure”. 
This argument has been widely criticized by several scholars. From an evolutionary perspective, 
for example, Cohen and Levinthal (1989) have argued that knowledge cannot be so easily absorbed 
unless imitative firms invest in their turn on a certain level of R&D effort: imitation is not costless 
and needs for some preexisting R&D activity’s “hard core”7. This standpoint could convey a 
paradoxical consequence: in an environment characterized by a great amount of spillover effects 
firms could have greater incentives to perform R&D since, in so doing, they might enlarge their 
absorptive capacity, i.e., their ability to benefit from others’ R&D efforts. In this way, they could 
more easily imitate and exploit market surpluses. Paradoxically and as a consequence, the level of 
R&D could be too high (rather than too low), since many firms could undertake too much R&D 
effort than that required to reach the same social results (for example, by an increase of duplications 
in R&D expenditures).  
Other scholars, on the contrary, have suggested that R&D should not be taken as a pure public 
good: a firm has a great amount of tools to protect its inventive capacity, such as patents, secrecy, 
and so on (Nadiri, 1993). 
The need for subsidization, other than that due to positive externalities, can be invoked since other 
market failures can be at work such as: 1. imperfect markets of capital, 2. missing markets for high-
risk investments (such as undersized venture capital markets), 3. too high barriers to entry and exit, 
4. excessive market power or, on the contrary, excessive fragmentation of market power (depending 
on what Schumpeter argument is invoked: Mark I opposed to Mark II), 4. lack of technological 
infrastructures and bridging institutions, 5. coordination failure of profitable R&D joint venture, 
producing duplications in R&D efforts and other resource wastes, and so on (see, for a general 
discussion, Martin and Scott, 2000).  
In the first case, the failure can arise because R&D investment could be too risky and asymmetric 
information between lenders and borrowers too high, generating in that way high funds’ rationing; in 
the third case, instead, imperfect competition due to barriers such as too high fixed costs to enter the 
market and/or too high costs to get out (sharp “sunk costs”), can produce a sub-optimal level of 
R&D expenditure; in the third case, the market structure and firms’ size determine the industrial 
R&D performance according to the complex system of incentives this market structure induces also 
at different sectoral level8; the fourth and five cause, finally, could depend on scarce material and 
immaterial knowledge infrastructures and on various “traps” in the functioning of the national 
system of innovation (Mowery, 1995; Metcalfe, 1995; Malerba, 1993).   
Coming back to spillovers, one important aspect that should be taken into account is what type of 
effect a subsidy can generate in their presence. As suggested by Klette, Møen and Griliches (2000), 
in fact, a subsidy can in its turn generate additional spillover effects, so that non-subsidized firms can 
profit from the R&D effort undertaken by subsidized firms. This fact generates another paradoxical 
conclusion: one uses a subsidy as a tool to internalize positive externality and correct market failure, 
while the same subsidy could generate additional spillovers by causing incremental market failure. 
This is something similar to the “dynamic complementarities” we saw above (since not only 
                                                                    
6 Through imitation mechanisms such as, for example, the “reverse engineering”.      
7 This originates from a conception of the firm as a “competence-based” structure.  
8 Martin and Scott (2000) suggest that policy intervention to promote R&D activity should be targeted and sector-
specific rather than widespread and generic; they make use of the Pavitt (1984) taxonomy to identify: 1. main sectoral 
mode of innovation, 2. sources of sectoral innovation failure, and 3. suitable policy instruments.   
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“direct”, but also “indirect” effects are at work). Does it make subsidies completely useless? As I 
will argue in the next section, under relevant spillovers, a subsidy could be ineffective statically, but 
effective and useful dynamically.          
2.1  The effect of R&D grants in presence of spillovers 
As any other positive externality the presence of spillovers, as we argued before, brings about static 
inefficiency. Nevertheless, they generate dynamic efficiency in that they afford to reach Pareto-
superior allocations than in the case of their lack. This phenomenon resembles quite faithfully the 
case of the passage from a competitive towards a monopolistic market structure, when monopoly 
produces significant cost reductions (scale economies). Figure 4 shows this aspect. 
For a better understanding of this figure, suppose that R = Q (i.e., one hour of R&D is held equal 
to one unit of product)9. We start, just to fix ideas, from the case in which there aren’t spillovers (i.e., 
no positive externalities exist). In this case, all firms do the level of R&D they desire (with perfect 
revelation of their preferences), and the equilibrium is on the point S0 where marginal social benefits 
and marginal social costs of doing R&D are equal (and the same thing happens on the side of 
commodities).  
This is a classical demand-supply equilibrium where we have posed that the cost, under absence 
of spillovers, are constant and equal to C0 (marginal and average costs are the same). The optimal 
level of R&D under these conditions is R0, that is the social optimum competitive equilibrium (i.e., 
the Pareto allocation).  
If now we allow for spillover effects, we are under ordinary positive externalities, since some 
firms can profit from the knowledge freely available in the industry. According to the standard 
positive externality results, we are tempted to say that the new equilibrium is now in M0, where only 
some firms reveal their preferences. This equilibrium falls on the crossing between the curve D1, i.e., 
the marginal private benefits, and the same marginal costs curve C0. The point M0 is clearly sub-
optimal since society has to bear a price of C0 per unit hour of R&D, obtaining only R1 hours of 
R&D when it would be possible, under this technology and preferences, to reach S0 which presents 
the same cost but a higher level of R.  
But the question at stake is another one. Indeed, under pervasive spillover effects, the actual 
equilibrium is no longer in M0, as one could expect, but rather in M1, whose cost (and level) of R&D 
is not only lower (and higher) if compared with the point M0, but also lower (and higher) than in the 
(previous) social optimum S0. In fact, the presence of spillovers reduces the cost of production of the 
free-riding firms, that aggregately lowers the “industrial” marginal social costs from C0 to C1. It 
follows that M1 rather than M0 is the new (actual) equilibrium.  
Note, however, that M0 is not the socially optimal equilibrium, given the new status of the 
technology (C1), but it is again a sub-optimal allocation since now society could, at least potentially, 
reach the level S1 where, at the same cost, it is possible to get an higher level of R&D (namely, R3).  
In conclusion: spillover effects surely generate static inefficiency, whereas they potentially can 
produce high dynamic efficiency in the provision of R&D. This is in the same spirit of the basic 
conclusion of the theory of endogenous growth driven by R&D spillovers (Romer, 1986; 1990).      
What happens when the government wants to correct for this failure? Assuming that the 
government knows where the economy is placed, providing a subsidy can move the curve D1 
towards the curve D0 until they coincide. The new equilibrium is now S1, the social optimum 
associated to the social costs C1. Nevertheless, if we allow the subsidy to generate additional 
spillovers the situation will change as explained in the second graph of figure 4.  
 
                                                                    
9 Throughout this exposition we overlap the market of R&D with the market of goods. This choice has only an 
explicative-didactic purpose. In particular, we are assuming that the presence of externality reduces the cost of 
producing R&D and goods to the same extent.  
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 3 /2008 
 
 14 
C0
C1
D0 = Marginal Social Benefit
S0M0
D1= Private Social Benefit
M1 S1
R1 R0 R2 R3 R
C1
D0 = D1
S1
R3 R
C2M2
R4
S2
R5
D2 = Marginal Social Benefit after the subsidy
 
FIGURE 4. THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC GRANTS ON THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF BUSINESS 
R&D IN PRESENCE OF SPILLOVERS 
 
 
Here, the new equilibrium (the long-run equilibrium) is in M2 which is, in turn, a sub-optimal 
point since subsidy spillovers have in the meantime created a new curve of marginal social benefits 
(D2) determining the social optimum in the point S2 where the cost is C2. In other words, any attempt 
to correct market failure by injecting subsidies could fail in presence of significant spillover effects 
since dynamic structural change (cost reductions) activated by the subsidy through the spillovers 
modify the expected allocation. The subsidy, nevertheless, will produce a substantial technical 
change and production growth (as long as directed towards sectors with higher spillovers).    
According to the analysis of Klette, Møen and Griliches (2000, p. 483), a full cost-benefit analysis 
of an R&D support would take into account the estimation of the following expression: 
 
[4]             ( ) ( ; ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i j k l
i Sub j NSub k Rest l C
w s s s s s CS d sπ π π
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
= Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
 
where Sub is the set of subsidized firms, NSub that of non-subsidized, Rest that of the rest of the 
economy, CS the consumer surplus and d(s) the loss associated to the subsidy. The first term on the 
right-hand-side of the [4] represents the change in profits of subsidized firms, that depends on the 
subsidy received (i.e., the direct effect of si) and the effect of the change in profits of the other 
supported firms (i.e., the indirect effect labeled s ); the second term is the change in profits of non-
subsidized firms (belonging to the same industry) that are a mixture of rent and knowledge 
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spillovers; the third is the pure rent spillovers pouring into the firm profits of the rest of the 
economy; the fourth, finally, is the change in consumer surplus.  
Whether these effects determine welfare gains or welfare losses is an open question. It critically 
depends on the relationships among the different subjects involved and, as we tried to explain 
before, on the firm reaction to subsidies. Therefore, the suitability of a subsidy should be judged 
according to the potential welfare changes defined by the [4]. The previous example in figure 4 
seems to suggest that a subsidy is always suitable; nevertheless, by combining these graphs with the 
previous results on dynamic complementarities (figure 3), we can conclude that a non-ambiguous 
answer to the suitability of supports to firm R&D activity appears to be quite hard, if not impossible, 
to be found.  
2.2 Econometric techniques: a taxonomy 
According to the previous analysis it should not be surprising that the econometric efforts trying to 
measure the effects of R&D subsidies on private R&D expenditure have had to cope with a really 
complex system of interrelated “direct” and “indirect” effects.  
Two main philosophies have been followed to address this complexity: the first and more 
extensively adopted approach, came up especially in the latest years, seems to prefer a more 
empirical-based point of view, where not a great deal of theoretical speculations have been brought 
into models except for those specific factors accounting for the selection criteria of supporting 
programs; examples of this kind are econometric exercises such as those based on the control 
function and matching estimators; the second stream of research, on the contrary, have tried to make 
more explicit the theoretical background laying behind the data, by building proper “structural 
models” in which causal relations are more explicitly and clearly identified. 
Sometimes the boundary between these two viewpoints is less pervasive and sharp than it can 
appear at a first glance. Nevertheless, for the sake of clearness, we provide a possible taxonomy of 
R&D evaluation models by distinguishing among three analytical dimensions:  
1. type of specification: distinguishing between models adopting a structural-analytical ap-
proach, where the outcome equation and the selection-into-program equation are separately 
modelled in a system of simultaneous equations, and non-structural models where only the 
outcome equation (the so-called “reduced form”) is estimated, once controlling for some spe-
cific covariates10;  
2. type of data used: models based on a cross-section dataset and models exploiting a  longitudi-
nal one (in so allowing also for dynamic and long-run analysis); 
3. type of policy variable: models using a binary policy variable (generally in the form of “sub-
sidized” versus “non-subsidized” units), and models using the policy variable in levels (i.e., in 
a continuous form).  
 
Table 1shows some representative studies we met in the literature according to this classification. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                    
10 As it will be clearer later, this distinction between structural and non-structural (or reduced-form) models 
couples with that between model taking into account endogeneity due to both “selection on observables” and 
“selection on unobservables” (the structural models), and those dealing with endogeneity due only to “selection on 
observables” (the non-structural or reduced-form models).   
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TABLE 1. R&D POLICY EVALUATION STUDIES ACCORDING TO THE TYPE OF 
SPECIFICATION, DATASET AND POLICY VARIABLE. CF-OLS: OLS ESTIMATION BASED ON 
A CONTROL FUNCTION, MATCHING: MATCHING MODELS, SELECTION: HECKMAN 
SELECTION MODEL, DID: DIFFERENCE-IN DIFFERENCES; IV: INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES 
(2SLS OR 3SLS) ESTIMATION   
TYPE OF 
SPECIFICATION 
 
TYPE OF DATASET 
TYPE OF 
POLICY 
VARIABLE 
 
METHOD 
Structural Reduced-
form 
Cross-
section 
Longitudinal Binary Level 
 
REPRESENTATIVE 
STUDIES 
 
CF-OLS 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
         
X 
 
Lichtenberg (1987) 
 
MATCHING 
 
  
X 
 
X 
  
X 
 Almus and Czarnitzki 
(2003) 
 
SELECTION 
 
 
X 
  
X 
  
X 
  
Busom (2000) 
 
DID 
 
  
X 
  
X 
 
X 
  
Lach (2000) 
 
IV 
 
 
X 
  
X 
   
X 
 
Wallsten (2000) 
 
 
The majority of works uses cross-section datasets while few studies make use of longitudinal 
data. Nevertheless longitudinal data, as it will be clearer later, allow also for dynamic (and long-run) 
treatment analysis, an aspect neglected by cross-section studies; also the distinction between works 
using subsidy in levels and those using subsidies in a binary form (supported vs. non-supported 
units) seems important: many econometric techniques, derived essentially from the 
microeconometrics of labor market evaluation, have been developed in setting where the policy 
factor (subsidies) is a binary variable; nevertheless, when possible, using levels is more informative 
than using a binary variable, since it allows not only to estimate the presence or absence of 
additionality, but also the strength of this effect in term of derivative.        
In what follows we start by presenting an overview of the structural models employed in the 
literature, their econometric estimation and potential improvements; then we will deal with 
techniques based on a reduce-form analysis paying particular attention, at the end of that part, on the 
longitudinal data and dynamic treatment setting.    
3. STRUCTURAL MODELS WITH SUBSIDY IN LEVEL 
They are the first generation of models trying to measure the effect of public subsidy on business 
R&D. In more recent years, nevertheless, more sophisticated structural models have been proposed; 
we review them starting from a very simplified model, going on presenting more sophisticated 
approaches in next sections. 
3.1 A (basic) model with exogenous subsidy 
To begin with, we consider a simple model drawn from Lichtenberg (1987) since it seems very 
useful and instructive to derive more complex (structural and non-structural) models; this model 
recalls the analytical model [1] and takes the following form: 
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[5]                     
0 1 2 1
0 1 2 2
MCC a a PRD a SUB
MRR b b PRD b SALES
MCC MRR M
ε
ε
= + + +
= + + +
= =
 
 
where PRD is the private R&D expenditure, SUB the subsidy received and 1ε , 2ε  are uncorrelated 
i.i.d. error terms. Lichtenberg assumes that all the right-hand-side variables of this model are strictly 
exogenous, so that the equilibrium condition (MCC = MRR = M) leads to the following “reduced 
form” for PRD (there exists, of course, also a reduced form for M):   
 
[6]                    0 1 2PRD SUB SALES uβ β β= + + +  
 
that can be easily consistently estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) or generalized least squares 
(GLS) in case of heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation.  
Equation [6] can also be seen as a “control function regression”: once controlled for sales and 
other additional variables (such as, for example, a sectoral dummy) we can assume that the 
covariance between SUB and u is zero, so that SUB becomes exogenous; this is a very simplified 
application of the so-called conditional independence assumption (Rubin, 1977): we restore 
exogeneity once conditioning on suitable covariates; as we will see more in-depth later, this 
assumption is at the basis of both “control function” and “matching” methods; nevertheless, models 
based on the previous assumption works well only when selection into subsidization is due to 
observable-to-analyst individual characteristics (such as “sales” and “sector” in the previous 
example); but when also unobservable-to-analyst characteristics affect the selection-into-program 
mechanism, these methods fail to consistently estimate the parameter 1β ; the central question, at the 
end, is “how to deal with subsidy endogeneity” and the next sections provide some definitions and 
possible solutions.    
3.2 The issue of subsidy’s endogeneity  
The previous model is quite a naïve one, since it assumes that the policy variable, SUB, is strictly 
exogenous. This assumption, nevertheless, seems to be too strong in this context for at least three 
reasons: simultaneity, omission of variables and measurement errors. 
Simultaneity 
It is likely that PRD and SUB are contemporaneously codetermined. This is due to the fact that the 
funding choice operated by the government is not independent of the level of firm PRD. For 
example, if a “picking-the winner” strategy is at work, firms with higher R&D activity are more 
likely to receive supports from government than weaker R&D performing firms. In this case, 
observing an high significant and positive level of 1β  in an OLS regression of equation [6] could be 
seriously misleading since part of this high partial regression effect of SUB on PRD could be due to 
the specific strategy operated by the government, rather than to the “direct” causal effect of SUB on 
PRD.  To better appreciate this point, suppose to derive equation [6] by SUB: 
 
[7]                       1
PRD u
SUB SUB
β∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ , 
the OLS estimation of the [6] is exactly the [7] and it takes into account both the “direct effect” of 
SUB on PRD ( 1β ) and the “indirect effect” of SUB on PRD ( /u SUB∂ ∂ ); the latter is that 
component of the causal relation between PRD and SUB passing through the link between SUB and 
u: what equation [7] points out is that the level of SUB is correlated to those unobservable factors 
determining the level of PRD11.  
                                                                    
11 When, in case of endogeneity, the OLS estimator takes into account “direct” as well as “indirect effects” of a 
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Suppose that the government knows these factors (for example, the intrinsic quality of the 
proposed R&D projects and the firm economic soundness) while the econometrician (the external 
observer) doesn’t, and suppose that the “only” factors affecting the endogeneity of SUB is the 
government funding strategy, then we can distinguish among three different cases: 
 
1. / 0u SUB∂ ∂ > , that implies that SUB is positively correlated with u (firm/project quality), so that 
a picking-the-winner strategy occurs and the unobserved (to econometrician) government strategy 
(hidden in the error u) brings about an upward bias of the OLS estimator.  
 
2. / 0u SUB∂ ∂ < , that implies that SUB is negatively correlated with those unobserved (to 
econometrician) factors increasing R&D performance and an “aiding-the-poor” strategy occurs (the 
government tends to finance weaker R&D performing firms) conveying a downward bias of the 
OLS estimator. 
 
3.   / 0u SUB∂ ∂ = , that implies no bias (the government funding scheme can be taken as random), 
since no correlation exists between SUB and PRD. The OLS estimation is, in this case, fully 
consistent. 
Omission of variables 
The problem arising in the previous case may be included within the more general case of “omission 
of relevant variables”. In fact, if the analyst were able to control for the variables used by the 
government to select potential receivers of funds, unless other unobservable variables were at work, 
an extended OLS regression such as the [6] augmented for those variables, would consistently 
estimate 1β . As we will see later on, this principle, known as “selection on observable”, is indeed at 
the basis of both OLS and matching estimators. Of course, if part of the government selection 
strategy remains unobserved, these estimators could continue to provide biased results: for example, 
many evaluation works do not have information about the quality of the proposed R&D projects, 
while they have substantial information on the economic soundness of the firms. This aspect could 
produce problem in the augmented-OLS (the “control function”) as well as in “matching” estimators.  
Error in measuring variables 
Another common problem determining endogeneity of the variable SUB could be errors in its 
measurement. Even if less important than in other fields of econometrics and statistics, also in our 
case these errors can produce substantial biases. We do not enter too much into this aspect since 
biases from errors in variables can be recovered by the same solution provided for the “simultaneity 
bias” (i.e., instrumental variables). 
3.3 A structural model with subsidy endogeneity 
When in equation [6] the policy variable SUB is supposed to be endogenous (for the reasons 
explained above), then it is no longer a reduced form; equation [6] is, instead, a single part of a 
“larger structural model” that needs to be uncovered. 
Lichtenberg (1988), recognizes the need to take the endogeneity problem seriously. His approach 
starts from keeping equation [6] by considering now the variable SUB as endogenous. In order to 
obtain a consistent estimation of 1β  he proposes a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation, i.e., an 
instrumental variables estimation where he instruments SUB with the “value of competitive contracts 
that were potentially awardable” to each firm (and that we label W); he supposes this variable to be 
correlated with SUB, but uncorrelated with u. 
This assumption, nevertheless, assumes a theoretical (although implicit) standpoint that can be 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
certain variable on another, the sum of these two effect is called “pseudo-true value” (see, Cameron and Trivedi, 
2005, p. 94).  
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assessed by making explicit its underlying structural model shaped according to the following 
system of two equations:  
 
[8]           0 1 2
0 1 2
   (structural equation for )
          (reduced form for )
PRD SUB SALES u PRD
SUB SALES W SUB
β β β
δ δ δ ε
= + + +⎧⎨ = + + +⎩
 
 
where u and ε  are correlated (what makes SUB endogenous in the PRD structural equation). The 
meaning of this structural equation is that unobservable (to analyst) factors affecting SUB (that is, 
ε ), affect contemporaneously the unobservable variables affecting PRD (that is, u), so that u and 
SUB are correlated (and SUB is endogenous). How can we estimate consistently the structural 
parameter 1β ?     
By substitution of the reduced form of SUB into the structural equation of PRD, we obtain the two 
reduced form for the two endogenous variable of the model: 
 
[9]            0 1 2
0 1 2
        (reduced form for )
         (reduced form for )
PRD SALES W v PRD
SUB SALES W SUB
π π π
δ δ δ ε
= + + +⎧⎨ = + + +⎩
 
 
where 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 1 2 1 2, , π β β δ π β β δ π β δ= + = + =   and 1v uβ ε= + . Since both the equations in system 
[9] are reduced forms we can estimate them by OLS and obtain consistently the structural 
parameters 0 1,  β β ,  and 2β . This approach is equivalent to the 2SLS estimation, but it has the virtue 
to put in evidence its structural derivation. Observe, however, that we can estimate this system only 
because we are in a just-identified setting, i.e., we can derive the structural parameters from the 
reduced form parameters12.  
One of the problems in systems like [8] and [9] is that the exogeneity of the instrument chosen 
(W) is not testable, since we are in a just-identified setting. Only in an over-identified setting we can 
test the combined exogeneity of the instrument chosen. To obtain an over-identified setting we need 
more than one instrument for SUB, a situation that is of course not so common and easy to get in 
applications. Observe, finally, that the type of instrument chosen can modify substantially the 
estimation, so this choice has to be done really carefully (see Greene, 2003, p. 385-400). 
3.3.1 Estimation improvement by 3SLS 
Compared to Lichtenberg (1988), Wallsten (2000) proposed an efficiency improvement of the 2SLS 
estimation of system [8], by introducing also a third equation and estimating the new system by 
three-stage least squares (3SLS). The improvement of 3SLS compared to 2SLS comes from 
considering, as additional sample information, the correlation between u and ε . Consider the 
reduced form system [9] (we overlook, for simplicity, the Wallsten’s third equation). It is easy to see 
that it is equivalent to a “seemingly unrelated regression” (SUR) model of the type: 
 
[10]      1 1 1
2 2 2
y x u
y x u
β
β
′= +⎧⎨ ′= +⎩
 
where the variables of the system [9] have been renamed for the sake of simplicity. In matrix form 
system [10] becomes: 
 
[11]         1 1 1
2 22
0
0
y ux
uxy
β
β
′⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥′⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 
 
                                                                    
12 Indeed, the model is just-identified because we have six reduced form parameters (π0, π1, π2, δ0, δ1, δ2) and six 
structural parameters (β 0, β1, β2, δ0, δ1, δ2).  
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 3 /2008 
 
 20 
or, more compactly: 
 
[12]      Y = XB + U  
    
If we define ( )E ′ =UU Ω , we have that the 3SLS is equivalent to the following SUR-generalized lest 
squares (SUR-GLS) estimation: 
 
[13]             ˆ ′ ′⊗ ⊗-1 -1N NB = [X (I Ω )X][X (I Ω )X] . 
 
A consistent estimation of Ω  is: 
 
[14]      ˆ ˆ ˆ / N′=Ω UU  
 
obtained by the residuals of the OLS of the two single equations in [10]13, so that a consistent 
feasible-GLS estimation of B can be obtained by substituting [14] into [13]. Observe that the 2SLS 
estimation of the previous section is obtained by [13] plugging-in Ω = I ; in other words, 2SLS do 
not take into account the information carried by the correlation between the error terms of the two 
equations, whereas 3SLS does it improving estimation efficiency. 
Observe, finally, that the model of Wallsten assumes a just-identified setting as Lichtenberg does, 
so the exogeneity of the instrument used (that is also the same used firstly by Lichtenberg) for SUB 
remains not testable. 
3.4 A model with barriers to innovation 
Gonzalez, Jaumandreu and Pazo (2005) recently proposed a more sophisticated structural model 
tacking into account also the presence of barriers to the R&D activity. Their work takes into explicit 
consideration the presence of “fixed cost” on the side of R&D performing firms. 
They model the firm R&D choice as a maximizing problem where the firm net revenue from 
R&D activity is ( )Y R  where R is the level of R&D expenditure. They assumes Y to be an increasing 
function of R ( / 0Y R∂ ∂ > ) but facing decreasing return ( 2 2/ 0Y R∂ ∂ < ). The profit function in 
presence of the subsidy is: 
 
[15]                ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 )Y R R S Y R R sR Y R s RΠ = − + = − + = − −  
 
where the maximization condition gives: 
 
[16]                        0      (1 )Y s
R R
∂Π ∂= ⇔ = −∂ ∂ . 
 
Since for each assigned level of profits the isoprofit line is: 
 
[17]                ( ) (1 )Y R s R= − +Π  
 
the optimal level of R&D can be find graphically in the point where this line is tangent to the net 
revenue function Y(R). 
According to equation [16], for any given level of s, firms determine the optimal level of R&D 
expenditure R*(s). Nevertheless, there exists a level of R that makes the firm indifferent between 
doing or not doing R&D activities and that continues to be optimal to implement for the firm. This 
threshold level (that we indicate with R ) satisfies the following two requirements: 
                                                                    
13 Indeed, since x are variables supposed to be strictly exogenous, separate OLS estimation of the two equations of 
[10] produces consistent estimation of β1 and β2, and therefore consistent estimations of u1 and u2.   
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1.   ( ) (0)
2.   / 0
R
R
Π = Π⎧⎨ ∂Π ∂ =⎩
 
 
i.e., it maximizes the profits (requirement 2) and it provides a level of profits equal to a null level of 
R&D expenditure (requirement 1). Figure 5 clarifies this condition by a graphical representation of 
the model. As it is immediate to see, if the firm finds optimal to perform R1 units of R&D, then the 
level of profits reached will be 1Π  that is lower than the level of profits achievable by a null level of 
R&D activity (i.e., Π ); in this case the firm will find optimal do not perform any R&D effort, since 
firm will reach a level of profits equal to Π  (with 1Π > Π ). Until the firm optimal level of R&D 
corresponds to a profit lower than Π  the firm will prefer not performing any R&D activity. When 
the firm finds optimal to produce exactly R  units of R&D expenditure it will be indifferent between 
performing R  or zero. On the contrary, when the firm finds optimal to perform an *R R>  we will 
have that *Π > Π  and the firm will have an incentive to produce exactly *R . 
In conclusion: when the firm finds optimal to perform a level of R R< , then it will prefer to 
produce a null level of R&D; on the contrary, when it finds optimal to perform a level of R R> , it 
has an incentive to produce exactly an *R amount of R&D effort.  
R*
Π*
Π1
R1 R R
Y(R)
Π
A
B
C
D
E
F
0
Isoprofit line
 
FIGURE 5. DETERMINATION OF THE OPTIMAL R&D EFFORT IN PRESENCE OF FIXED COSTS 
 
The next step of the González et al. (2005) model is to provide an econometric counterpart of this 
theoretical model.  
To begin with, they consider *R  and R  by specifying a function for both these variables; hence, 
the following system has to be estimated: 
 
[18]            1
2
R x s u
R z x s u
β γ
λ ω θ
∗⎧ ′= + +⎪⎨ ′ ′= + + +⎪⎩
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where x are variables other than the subsidy affecting both the total firm R&D expenditure and the 
threshold, s is share of the subsidy S on total R&D outlays, z are variables affecting only the barriers 
to R&D activities encountered by the firm and (u1, u2) are correlated error terms.  
A fundamental characteristic of this kind of models is that R∗  is observable only when R R∗ > ; 
furthermore, R  is in its turn unobserved. From system [18] we can write: 
 
[19]      R R x z s vρ λ τ∗ ′ ′− = − + +  
 
where 1 2( )v u u= − , ( )ρ β ς= − , ( )τ γ θ= − . By posing into [19] x z s wρ λ τ δ′ ′ ′− + =  we obtain 
the following system: 
 
[20]           1
.
R x s u
R R w v
β γ
δ
∗
∗
⎧ ′= + +⎪⎨ ′− = +⎪⎩
 
 
The variable R R∗ − , a we said, is not observable; we only know that R∗  is observable when 
0R R∗ − > ; according to this setting system [20] becomes: 
 
[21]           1
1[ 0] 1[ 0]
R x s u
y R R w v
β γ
δ
∗
∗
⎧ ′= + +⎪⎨ ′= − > = + >⎪⎩
 
 
where we assume that: (a) w is always observed while R∗  is observed only if y = 1; (b) ( 1u , v) are 
independent of w and have zero mean; (c) (0;1)v normal  ; (d) E( 1u |v) = φv (i.e., 1u  and v are 
correlated).  
According to Amemiya (1985) classification, such a model is called a “type II Tobit model” and 
can be consistently estimated by a two-step Heckman (1979) procedure. In fact, a simple OLS of R∗  
on x and s would be inconsistent. To appreciate this point, consider the expectation of R∗  
conditioned on all the variables (observable and unobservable); we have14: 
 
[22]              1( | , , , ) ( | ) [ ]E R x w s v x s E u v x s vβ γ β γ ϕ∗ ′ ′= + + = + +  
 
since, as stated before, ( 1u , v) are independent of w. If φ = 0, then no sample selection appears and 
OLS of R∗  on x, s would be consistent. When, on the contrary, 0ϕ ≠ , then OLS becomes 
inconsistent; in fact, by applying the law of iterated expectations to equation [21], we have: 
 
[23]                     ( | , ) [ ] ( | , ) [ ] ( , )E R w y x s E v w y x s h w yβ γ ϕ β γ ϕ∗ ′ ′= + + = + + . 
 
If we knew ( , )h w y , we could obtain consistent estimation of β and γ by an OLS of R∗ on x, s and 
( , )h w y ; furthermore, since R∗  is observable only when y = 1, we only need ( ,1)h w ; it can be 
proved that: 
 
[24]                               ( ,1) ( | ) ( )h w E v v w wδ ψ δ′ ′= > − =  
                                                                    
14 This part draws on Wooldridge (2002, pp. 560-566).  
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where ( ) ( ) / ( )ψ φ⋅ = ⋅ Φ ⋅  is the inverse Mills ratio. Therefore, we can substitute [24] into [23] getting: 
 
[25]                         ( | , 1) [ ] ( )E R w y x s wβ γ ϕ ψ δ∗ ′ ′= = + + ⋅ . 
 
Now, a consistent estimation of δ, β and γ can be obtained by an OLS regression of R∗  on x, s and 
( )wψ δ′ , provided that a consistent estimation of ( )ψ ⋅  is previously available. Heckman (1979) 
provided the following two-step estimation procedure of equation [24]: 
 
Step 1. Obtain a consistent estimate of δ by estimating the following probit model: 
 
 Pr( 1| ) ( )y w wδ′= = Φ  
using all N observations. 
 
Step 2. Obtain an estimate of β and γ from an OLS regression of : 
 
R∗  on x, s and ψˆ , 
 
using the selected sample (i.e., the group identified by y = 1)15. Finally, a t-test can be used to check 
the hypothesis φ = 0, i.e., the absence of selection bias, once standard errors corrected for generated 
regressors are used16. 
Under the additional hypothesis of joint normality of u1 and v, also a partial maximun liklihood 
estimation (partial-MLE) can be implemented, since the model becomes fully parameteric. Under 
these circumstances, partial-MLE is more efficient of the two-step procedure, even if it could present 
substantial problem of convergence17.  
3.4.1 Measuring the effects of subsidy by profitability gaps 
The forgone model allows us for estimating consistently the sign, magnitude and significance of 
the subsidy parameter γ. According to the significance of this parameter we can conclude about the 
occurrence or lack of additionality, as in the previous structural model. 
Nevertheless a threshold model, can give us also additional insights on firms’ behavior when 
compared with more standard structural models; from the previous equations, indeed, we can com-
pute: 
1. the individual optimal non-zero level of effort ( R∗ ) 
2. the threshold estimates ( Rˆ ).   
 
According to this two values we can define the “profitability gap”, that is, the difference between 
the optimal non zero R&D effort in absence of subsidy and the estimated threshold effort: 
 
* ˆProfitability gap = ( )R S R− − . 
                                                                    
15 Observe that, in this model, identification condition requires that ( ) ( ) 1num x num z≤ + .  
16 Since ψˆ  is a generated regressor, usual standard errors are incorrect. However a new formula from generated 
regressors analysis can be drawn (see: Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 115-117).  
17 Gonzalez et al. use partial-MLE for their model. 
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 3 /2008 
 
 24 
 
If the profitability gap is negative, it identifies a firm that, without the subsidy, would engage in a 
R&D effort lower than the threshold: without the subsidy, hence, such a firm would have not been 
engaged in any R&D effort. Receiving the subsidy, on the contrary, allows this firm to reach an op-
timal non-zero R&D effort.  
If the probability gap is positive, on the contrary, it identifies the non-zero level of R&D that a 
certain firm would have performed even in absence of the subsidy; for such a firm, the amount of the 
subsidy only adds to the firm own positive R&D effort.  
In such a model, hence, the additionality comes from firms with a negative profitability gap, since 
they would have been “non-performers” in absence of the subsidy18. 
3.5 Barriers to innovation adding subsidy endogeneity 
Although theoretically rich, the threshold model proposed by Gonzalez et al. (2005) does not take 
into account formally the endogeneity of the subsidy. As we stated above, in fact, the level of the 
subsidy depends on the government (and, at least partially, on firm) decision and it could be function 
of R&D and other firm characteristics. 
To take into account this occurrence we add an equation for s to system [21] obtaining19:  
 
[26]             
1
1 11[ 0]
R x s u
y w s v
s m
β γ
δ τ
ω ε
∗⎧ ′= + +⎪ ′= + + >⎨⎪ ′= +⎩
 
 
where 1 1w x zδ ρ λ′ ′ ′= −  and where m can contain either new variables or part of those in x and w and 
where we allow for arbitrary correlation between u1, v and ε. We suppose that variables contained in 
x, w and m are all strictly exogenous, while 1( ; ) 0Cov s u ≠ . By substituting the third equation into the 
second we get: 
1 11[ ]y w mδ ι υ′ ′= + +  
 
where vυ τε= +  and ι ωτ= . Observe that w and z are all exogenous for υ . The system becomes: 
 
[27]              1
1 11[ ].
R x s u
y w m
β γ
δ ι υ
∗⎧ ′= + +⎪⎨ ′ ′= + +⎪⎩
 
 
To derive a consistent estimation of γ write the first equation as: 
 
[27.1]     1( , , , )R x s g x m w y eβ γ∗ ′= + + +  
 
where 1( , , , ) ( | , , , )g x m w y E u x m w y=  and 1 1 1( | , , , )e u E u x m w y= −  with, by definition, 
1( | , , , ) 0E e x m w y = . Equation [27.1] can be estimated by 2SLS on the selected sample (the group 
where y=1) using as instruments ,  ,  x m w  and ( , , ,1)g x m w , where we know that 
1( , , ,1) ( | , , ,1) ( )x m wg x m w E u x m w x m wθψ δ δ δ= = + + .  According to these conditions, a two step 
                                                                    
18 Observe that, whereas for the model estimation Gonzalez et al. use all N = 2214 firms (with a total of 9455 
observations, since they have an unbalanced panel for 1990-99), for the calculus of the profitability gap they only use 
firms with non-zero R&D effort (i.e., performing firms) and positive subsidy.  
19 See Wooldridge (2002, p. 567-570). 
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procedure can be applied for consistent estimation: 
 
Step 1. Obtain and estimate of , ,x m wδ δ δ  by a probit regression of y on ,  ,  x m w  and take the 
estimated inverse Mills ratios ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ( )x m wx m wψ δ δ δ′ ′ ′+ + ; 
 
Step 2. Using only the selected sample estimate the equation: 
 
ˆR x s errorβ γ λψ∗ ′= + + +  
 
by 2SLS using x, ψˆ , m and w as instruments; as before the hypothesis of no-selection problem can 
be test by H0: 0θ =  with usual 2SLS t-test20. Note, nevertheless, that standard errors should be 
corrected for the generated regressors problem as before.  
3.6 Lagged endogenous subsidy with auto-correlated errors: a note 
Introducing lagged values of s into the previous structural models of the effect of subsidy in R&D 
expenditure such as: 
 
[28]          0 1 1 2 2 ...it it it it it itR x s s s uβ γ γ γ− −′= + + + + +  
 
does not provide estimation problems provided that s is “strictly exogenous” or “predetermined”. 
When s is only contemporaneously endogenous, on the contrary, some estimation problems can 
arise, even if we rule out the contemporaneous subsidy from the previous regression. 
Suppose that s is only contemporaneously endogenous; it means that: 
 
[29]        
( ) 0   if   
( ) 0      otherwise  
ir it
ir it
E s u r s
E s u
⋅ ≠ =⎧⎨ ⋅ =⎩
 
 
and suppose then that the error term in [28] is auto-correlated by order one: 
 
[30]        , 1
: . . .
it i t it
it
u u
i i d
ρ ε
ε
−= +⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
 
 
Suppose, finally, that equation [28] reduces to: 
 
[31]     0 1 1it it it it itR x s s uβ γ γ −′= + + + ; 
 
it is easy to show that, under these assumptions: 
 
, 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 1 , 1 1( ; ) ( ; ) ( ; ) ( ; ) ( ; ) 0i t it i t it it i t it i t it i t itCov s u Cov s u Cov s u Cov s Cov s uρ ε ρ ε ρ− − − − − − − −= + = + = ≠ , 
 
proving that 1its −  is now endogenous. By substitution of [30] into [31] we get that: 
 
                                                                    
20 Observe that for parameters’ identification this procedure asks for the presence of all exogenous variables in the 
linear projection of s on  x, ψˆ , m and w.  
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0 1 1 1it it it it it itR x s s uβ γ γ ρ ε− −′= + + + + ; 
 
therefore, provided that a consistent estimation of  1itu −  is available, equation [32] can be estimated 
by GLS. A consistent estimation of  1itu −  can be obtained by a 2SLS regression of [31] that should 
provide as residuals: 
2
1ˆ
SLS
itu −  
 
as long as at least one instrument for its  in [31] is available.  
4. METHODS BASED ON A BINARY SUBSIDY VARIABLE: ESTIMATION OF THE AVERAGE 
TREATMENT EFFECT BY CONTROL FUNCTION, MATCHING AND SELECTION MODELS  
So far we have considered estimation methods based on the availability of a continuous subsidy 
variable. In this section we address the problem of testing the presence of additionality when only a 
binary subsidy variable is at our disposal, by continuing to refer to a cross-section data structure. 
This setting, however, can be encompassed within the more general framework of the average 
treatment effect (ATE) estimation. Therefore, in what follows we first provide a concise introduction 
of the ATE estimation approach by presenting the main core concepts we need to get through the 
subject of this section. 
4.1 The ATE setting 
The main estimation problem arising in non-experimental statistical designs is that the traditional 
estimation procedure based on the simple comparison between average values of treated and 
untreated individuals (in our case: supported and non-supported firms) fails to estimate consistently 
the hypothesis of “additionality” of treatment on a certain target variable. 
In non-experimental designs, in fact, treatment is non-random since firms can (at least to some ex-
tent) decide their status of participation (self-selection), as well as government can select to finance 
particular subjects according to specific objective functions (for ex., by adopting the principle of 
“aiding-the-poor” or, on the contrary, of “picking-the-winner”); we saw that point to be at the basis 
of subsidy endogeneity into equation [6]. 
In econometric terms it means that the treatment variable w (assuming, this time, the value 1 for 
treated and 0 for untreated units) and the outcome variable y (assuming the value y1 for treated and y0 
for untreated units) are stochastically dependent. In this case we cannot trust the usual approach of 
the classical inference, such as the simple comparison between the mean of treated and untreated 
units. 
In the classical inference, in fact, where y and w are supposed to be mean-independent21, we have 
that the mean of y conditional on w is equal to the unconditional mean of y, i.e., E(y|w) = E(y). By 
defining the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) as: 
 
[32]            ATE = E(y1 - y0) 
 
and the Average Treatment Effect on Treated (ATET) as: 
 
[33]          ATET = E(y1 - y0 | w=1), 
                                                                    
21 As we will state later, “mean-independency” is less restrictive than overall independency. 
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we can observe that, under mean-independence: E(y | w=1) = E(y1 | w=1) = E(y1) and E(y | w=0) = 
E(y0 | w=0) = E(y0); therefore we obtain: 
 
ATE = ATET =  E(y | w=1) - E(y | w=0) 
 
that is, ATE and ATET coincide with the “difference-in-mean estimator” of basic statistics (i.e., the 
average of y for treated minus the average of y for non-treated individuals); this estimator, as it is 
well known, is unbiased, consistent and asymptotical normal (see Wooldridge, 2002, p. 606).  
When the mean-independence hypothesis does not hold, then the ATE and ATET generally differ 
and, most importantly, the “difference-in-mean estimator” cannot estimate consistently both these 
parameters.  
To overcome this estimation problem econometricians have suggested different approaches under 
specific hypotheses: control function using OLS, matching, instrumental variables and selection 
models methods are the most known. All these approaches are alternatively suitable according to the 
underlying process generating the data, sharing in turn differential advantages and drawbacks (for a 
concise review see Heckman, 2001). 
Implementing an Instrumental Variables approach solves the problem of selection on unobserv-
ables22. In this case, as we said above, the researcher needs to know a full set of exogenous variables 
(the instruments) correlated with the treatment variable w and uncorrelated with the outcome y, in 
order to build a 2SLS estimation of the evaluation equation. Generally specking, as in many other 
field of econometrics, finding appropriate instruments is not easy and asks also for some degree of 
arbitrariness (especially in a just-identified specification). The Selection Model approach (as in the 
Heckman (1978) two-stage selection model) is a powerful method to deal, as in the case of the in-
strumental variables, with selection on unobservables, but it requires some specific distributional hy-
pothesis that other models do not need.  
The Control Function and the Matching Estimators, on the contrary, ask for less requirements to 
be applied than the previous methods, but are not suitable to deal with important aspects such as the 
selection on unobservables. They are suited just in the case of selection on observables23. In fact, 
they both start from the idea that the treatment status is correlated with specific observed character-
istics of firms that, once controlled for, restores the condition of a randomised experiment (this hy-
pothesis is known as ignorability of treatment). Hence, by conditioning on these observable charac-
teristics, these methods consistently estimate the ATE and ATET even in case of treatment’s non-
observable heterogeneity and selection on results24. Although their limits, if the researcher has at his 
disposal a wide set of observed variables, the problem of selection on unobservables should be at-
tenuated. For this reasons the majority of studies in the field of microeconometric policy evaluation 
makes use of OLS and matching25. 
Matching, nonetheless, seems to be preferable to control function based on OLS at least for three 
reasons. First, it is a non-parametric estimation procedure, so that it does not need to specify a par-
ticular parametric relation between the dependent variable and its regressors as in the case of OLS 
                                                                    
22 We have selection on unobservables when idiosyncratic characteristics unobservable to the researcher are 
correlated with the treatment status variable. Without controlling for these characteristics, estimates can be 
inconsistent since these features can behave as potential confounders (see, Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil, 2006).  
23 We have selection on observables when only characteristics observable to the researcher are correlated with the 
treatment status variable so that, controlling opportunely for them, ATE and ATET estimates will be consistent.  
24 We have treatment’s non-observable heterogeneity when the effect of treatment is different in different treated 
units. We have selection on results when treatment’s non-observable heterogeneity is correlated with the treatment 
variable.  
25 For the effect of public subsidy on business R&D or on innovative preformance using matching methods see: 
Almus and Czanitzki (2003), Duguet (2003), Aerts and Czanitzki (2004), Kaiser (2004), Lööf and Heshmati 
(2007) and Bérubé and Mohnen (2007). 
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(where an additive/linear form is assumed); second, the matching procedure considers only treated 
and non treated units in the common support by dropping all the controls whose variables’ value is 
higher or smaller than that of the treated. Third and more importantly, matching reduces the number 
of non-treated to a sub-sample (the selected controls) with characteristics more homogeneous to the 
treated units. These properties of the matching method prevent those biases in the ATE and ATET 
estimation that simple OLS estimation cannot solve (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, pp. 871-878). 
In the next section, we present a concise overview of the OLS and matching procedure, to con-
tinue presenting the selection model in the case of a binary treatment variable.  
4.2 The matching estimator 
Different kinds of matching estimators have been proposed in the literature. Among them the most 
applied are those based on propensity scores (propensity score matching). Defined as the probability 
for an individual to get treated, conditional on a certain numbers of observable characteristics, the 
propensity score is an index function summarizing in a single number (the score) the wide set of 
observable characteristics affecting the probability of becoming treated. It is obtained from a probit 
regression where w, the treatment status, is the dependent variable and observable characteristics are 
the regressors. The propensity score approach solves the dimensionality problem arising when the 
number of covariates is high and exact matching is not possible (see, for example, Dehejia and 
Wahba, 2002 and Ichino, 2006)26. 
Various propensity score matching have been developed, such as: “stratification”, “radius”, 
“kernel” and “nearest neighbour” matching. All these methods can lead to different estimates of the 
ATET, so that a robust strategy should take into account this aspect by comparing or averaging on 
them27.  
Before explaining our matching procedure, it seems of worth to better clarify what kind of statis-
tical problem we face in our setting. As we said, we are interested in estimating the average treat-
ment effect on treated (ATET) defined as: 
 
ATET = E(y1 - y0 | w=1) = E(y1 | w=1) – E( y0 | w=1). 
 
As it is clear, whereas we can observe the quantity E(y1 | w=1) since it is equal to the outcome of 
treated units when they were treated, we “do not observe” the quantity E(y0 | w=1). From 
observation, in fact, we only know the variable E(y0 | w=0), i.e., the (average) level of the outcome 
                                                                    
26 Instead of the propensity score, another class of matching estimators use a specific metric (such as the 
Mahalanobis or the Euclidian one) to measure the distance between a treated and an untreated unit. Recently, also 
hybrid approaches have been developed using, for example, a Mahalanobis metric whose arguments are 
contemporaneously the covariates and the propensity score (see, for example, Lechner, 2001). It is not clear, 
however, which is the efficiency gain of hybrid models (see Zaho, 2004). 
27 Few studies have compared the performance of different kinds of matching estimators. Dehejia and Wahba 
(2002) found that “The choice among matching methods becomes important when there is minimal overlap between 
the treatment and comparison groups” (p. 158) concluding that, either in presence of greater or smaller overlap, the 
nearest neighbour matching performs quite well; in fact, when the true ATET coming from the benchmark (in their 
work, a previous experimental setting) is about $ 1,794, the nearest neighbour’s ATET is equal to about $ 1,360 in 
the case of greater overlap and $ 1,890 in the case of smaller overlap. Starting from the same database of Dehejia and 
Wahba (2002), Cameron and Trivedi (2005, pp. 893-896) have shown, on the contrary, that the nearest neighbour 
matching performs worse than other matching methods when slight modifications in the controls’ selection criteria 
are implemented (such as, the “common support” restriction). They obtain a nearest neighbour’s ATET of about $ 
2,385 that overestimates the true value of $ 1,794 using the same Dehejia and Wahba (2002) propensity score 
specification. Zhao (2004), finally, compared various matching models in a Monte Carlo experiment; he concludes 
that “Monte Carlo experiments show that the different methods do not dominate each other in term of performance” 
(p. 100). Generally speaking, methods perform very differently according to the availability of good controls, their 
number, and the specification of the propensity score equation.    
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for non-treated units. Knowing what would have been the outcome for treated units if they had not 
been treated is impossible, since we can see only one of the two participation status for each single 
unit. This falls into the general statistical setting of a “missing observation” (Lee, 2005).  
In a cross-section dataset, the idea behind the matching procedure is to estimate E(y0 | w=1) using 
non-treated units that are “similar” to treated units. This similarity can be checked according to 
several firms characteristics such as size, turnover, sector in which the firm operates and so on. 
When for each treated unit a similar non-treated unit has been selected among all potential non-
treated units a comparable sub-sample is produced and it can be proved that the ATET is 
consistently estimated. In other words, we estimate E(y0 | w=1) with those non-treated firms that are 
like “twins” of the treated ones. More precisely, we hold: 
 
[34]             E( y0 | w=1, X=x) = E( y0 | w=0, X=x). 
 
Relation [34] is valid only under conditional independence assumption (Rubin, 1977; Rosenbaum 
and Rubin, 1983): conditional on some pre-treatment observables (the variables X), we assume y and 
w to be independent28. In this case, the conditional ATET estimate becomes: 
  
[35]                 ATET (x) = E( y1| w=1, X=x) - E( y0 | w=0, X=x). 
 
Equation [35] allows for identifying “cells” within which y and w are independent. To clarify this 
point, suppose that X is formed by two dichotomous variables A and B taking modalities a1 ,a2 and 
b1, b2 respectively. In this case four cells can be built. According to the conditional independence 
assumption, within each of these cells the experimental setting is restored and the “difference-in-
mean estimator” consistently estimate the ATET(x). To obtain the ATET overall estimation we have 
only to integrate on X (obtaining its marginal distribution). It means that we have to take the mean of 
the various ATET(x) calculated in each cell weighted by the distribution of X conditional on w=1. If 
X is a discrete random variable: 
 
x
ATET = ATET(x) Pr(X = x | w= 1)⋅∑ . 
 
When X is highly dimensional or is a continuous variable, an exact matching is not possible. In 
general too many cells have to be built, running the risk of obtaining a large number of cells with 
zero observations. To avoid this drawback (the dimensionality problem), Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) proposed to match individuals according to a single variable: the propensity score. As said 
above, it is obtained from a probit regression with regressors equal to the variables contained in X. 
Each treated and untreated unit has its own propensity score, and units with close propensity score 
are matched. In practise, the authors propose a procedure to form strata according to the propensity 
score in which is tested the so called “balancing property”: in each stratum and for each variable 
(included the propensity score) the mean on treated and non treated has to be equal. This procedure 
generates the optimal number of strata as soon as the balancing property is satisfied in each stratum. 
Once obtained this partitioning we can averaging on the “difference-in-mean estimator” on strata 
obtaining a consistent estimation of the ATET (see, Becker and Ichino (2002) for a software 
implementation). This procedure is called the “Stratification matching”.  
Even if one makes use of matching procedures other than the Stratification matching, the 
balancing property has always to be satisfied. Therefore, we have first to test this property on our 
                                                                    
28 “Conditional-independence-assumption” is another name to call the already cited “ignorability of treatment”. In 
any case, to obtain consistent matching estimate, we only needs “conditional-mean-independence” that is a less 
restrictive hypothesis (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 607).  
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data (in order to ascertain that our probit specification for the calculus of propensity scores is 
correct) and then applying each matching procedure.  
We have now all the ingredients to describe the general protocol adopted in matching models. We 
implement the following steps: 
 
1. we specify a probit regression on a given set of covariates (x) estimating the propensity scores 
ˆ ( )p x ; 
2. according to the estimates obtained in the previous step, we test the balancing property taking 
the specification satisfying it, and reducing observations on treated units to those in the com-
mon support; 
3. according to the considered matching method and for each treated unit, we select the potential 
control(s), that is, those non-treated units more similar to the treated ones; 
4. once obtained the matched comparison group, we calculate the estimated ATET using the ap-
propriate formula. 
 
Of course, different matching methods require different formulas for the calculus of the ATET; 
application generally use: 1. stratification, 2. one-to-one nearest neighbour, 3. three-nearest 
neighbours, 4. kernel, 5. radius (with various callipers) matching.  
We have already qualitatively explained in which way the stratification matching works. The 
corresponding formula for the estimated ATET is29: 
 
( )
1
iBS S i I b
b
ib
i
w
ATET ATET
w
∈
=
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= ⋅ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑∑ ∑          with:       1 0( ) ( )
1 1S
b i jT C
b bi I b j I b
ATET y y
N N∈ ∈
= −∑ ∑ , 
where: I(b) is set of units present in block b, TbN is the number of treated units in block b, 
C
bN  is the 
number of control units in block b.  
Other matching methods deserve some further explanation. In the case of the one-to-one nearest 
neighbour each treated is matched with only one control (always in the common support), whose 
propensity score is the closest to that of the treated one according to some specific metric (for 
example, the Mahalanobis metric). In this case the set of control units is defined as: 
 { }( )     |  min  i jjC i j p p= −  
 
that, for each unit i is a singleton unit j (or three units in the case of the three-nearest neighbours). 
Instead, the set of control units in the case of the “radius” matching is: 
 { }( )     |  <  i jC i j p p r= −  
 
representing all the non-treated units falling (always in terms of their propensity score) in the radius 
of dimension r. A general formula for all these matching methods is the following: 
 
                                                                    
29 This part of the section draws on Ichino (2006).  
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[36]                                      
( )
1M T C
i ij jT
i T j C i
ATET y y
N
ω
∈ ∈
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∑  
 
where 0 1ijω< <  is the weight given to the control unit j-th in the comparison with the unit i-th 
(with:
( )
1ij
j C i
ω
∈
=∑ ). For each treated unit i, the sum in the square brackets is thus a weighted average 
of its (selected) control units. In the case of the “arithmetic mean”, the weights become 
1/ Cij iNω = and the previous formula reduces to: 
 
( )
1 1ArM T C
i jT C
ii T j C i
ATET y y
N N∈ ∈
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ . 
 
Therefore, for the nearest neighbour matching, since CiN =1 (so that j=i), the formula becomes: 
 
1NN T C
i iT
i i
ATET y y
N
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ , 
 
while for the three-nearest neighbours, it takes the following form: 
 
( )
1 1
3
3NN T C
i jT
i T j C i
ATET y y
N ∈ ∈
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ . 
 
Furthermore, the kernel matching comes up from equation [36] when: 
 
1
( )
( )
C
i
j i
ij N
j i
j
K p p
K p p
ω
=
−=
−∑
, 
 
where K  is the kernel function.  
Finally, provided that outcomes are considered independent across units, it can be proved that the 
analytical variance of the estimator in equation [36] is equal to: 
 
2
2
1 ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
M T C
i j jT
j T j C
Var ATET Var y Var y
N
ω
∈ ∈
⎛ ⎞ = +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ∑ ∑  
 
where j ijiω ω=∑ . It is quite clear that there is a penalty for using the same controls more than one 
time. 
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4.3 Matching estimation in presence of R&D subsidy spillovers 
As we said above, the matching procedure is based on comparing a treated unit with a non-treated 
one resulting very similar to the first in term of economic structure. As suggested by Klette, Møen 
and Griliches (2000), nevertheless, the presence of high spillover effects induced by the subsidy on 
non-supported firms could severely underestimate the level of the (actual) additionality; indeed, 
since more similar firms are likely to be more “linked” (than dissimilar firms), when the R&D 
support is provided only to some firms, then its beneficial effect will be transmitted also to other 
firms according to their “closeness” to the first ones; since the “control group” is defined exactly as 
those non-supported units that are very similar to the supported units (in terms of economic 
structure), then it is likely that even these particular non-supported firms will benefit “indirectly” of 
the support, in so augmenting their R&D effort through their linkages with supported units.  
In this sense, it would be not surprising if the level of additionality were underestimated; 
econometrically, it is like a sort of “omission of relevant variable” (as we saw above), that should be 
taken into serious account when getting results.  
In this setting, one possible solution could be that of introducing into the structural equation 
governing the effect of support on R&D effort a spillover measure due to the support; nevertheless, 
when the support variable is binary and levels are unknown (as in the matching case), how can we 
produce a sound measure of the spillover variable? The previous authors do not provide any specific 
answer to this important issue; they only seems to look at that as a “cautionary footnote” for those 
implementing matching procedure.  
What is now quite clear is that, when using matching rather than control function based on OLS, 
this problem is surely exacerbated; in such a situation, therefore, the benefits of using matching 
could not outweigh those of using simple OLS.   
5. A STRUCTURAL SELECTION MODEL WITH BINARY TREATMENT 
So far, we have considered a binary support variable both in a control function (based on OLS) and 
in a matching context; these methods are strongly empirical since the only included theoretical 
aspects are those concerning the choice of the control variables. Nevertheless, even in a setting 
where subsidization takes a binary form a structural model can be used. 
According to Busom (2000), a selection structural model has two main advantages compared to 
matching and OLS: 1. it can overcome the problem of “selection on unobservables” that matching 
(as well as OLS) are unable to treat; 2. It can make more explicit the underlying theoretical model by 
the specification of a system of behavioural equations. We briefly present this approach.  
If some unobservable variables affect simultaneously the outcome and the treatment status, even 
by conditioning on the right observables, the estimation of the ATET could be inconsistent since, by 
definition, w and y are still correlated. To take into account the presence of selection on unobserv-
ables, Heckman (1978) and Maddala (1983) provided an estimation procedure for a model with en-
dogenous selection; the model is composed of two (correlated) equations: one for the outcome and 
one for the selection equation, and takes the following form: 
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[37]              
*
*
*
1     0
0     0
( ; ) 0
i i i i
i i i
i
i
i
i i
R x w u
w z v
if w
w
if w
Cov u v
μ γ α
η β
ρ
= + + +⎧⎪ = + +⎪⎪ ⎧ ≥⎨ ⎪= ⎨⎪ <⎪⎪ ⎩⎪ = ≠⎩
 
 
where x and z are covariates and u and v are unobservable components (error terms) with zero un-
conditional mean, but supposed to be correlated. Under this assumptions ( ) 0i iE w u⋅ ≠ , so that the 
OLS estimate of the outcome equation is inconsistent. We could rewrite the first equation of [37] in 
the two different regimes: 
1:    
0 :    .
i i i i
i i i i
w y x u
w y x u
μ γ α
μ γ
= = + + +⎧⎨ = = + +⎩
 
 
It would seem possible to run two OLS regressions on them, obtaining α  as the difference be-
tween the two (estimated) intercepts. The problem of this procedure, unfortunately, is that under 
both the regimes the error term has not zero unconditional mean; in fact: 
 
( | ) ( ) 0
( | ) ( ) 0.
i i i i
i i i i
E u v z E u
E u v z E u
η β
η β
≥ − − ≠ =⎧⎨ < − − ≠ =⎩
 
 
This is a typical case of “omitted variable specification error”, that can be solved by adding the 
non-zero means into the equations, obtaining:  
 
[38]                    
1:    [ ( | )]
0 :    [ ( | )].
i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i
w y x u E u v z
w y x u E u v z
μ γ α η β
μ γ η β
= = + + + − ≥ − −
= = + + − < − −  
 
Now, the errors terms in the squared brackets have zero mean. The problem, nevertheless, is that 
we cannot observe ( | )i i iE u v zη β≥ − −  and ( | )i i iE u v zη β< − −  directly. Nevertheless, we can es-
timate them by using the participation equation and the joint normality of u and v. From the joint 
normality it can be proved that: 
 
1 1
0 0
( | )
( | )
i i i i
i i i i
E u v z M
E u v z M
η β λ
η β λ
≥ − − = −
< − − = −  
 
where: 1 ( ) /[1 ( )]i i iM z zφ η β η β= − − −Φ − −  and 0 ( ) /[ ( )]i i iM z zφ η β η β= − − Φ − −  are the Mill’s 
ratios (with φ  and Φ  being the normal density function and its cumulative respectively), while 
1 ,u u vλ σ σ= ⋅ and 0 ,u u vλ σ σ= − ⋅ 30. 
We can estimate equations [38] by a two-step procedure or via maximum likelihood (Maddala, 
1983). In the two-step we first estimate 1iM  and 0iM  (once obtained a consistent estimation of η 
and β from a probit regression of the participation equation); secondly, with these estimations at 
hand, we can estimate 1λ  and 0λ  by simple OLS31. We might then calculate also the coefficient of 
correlation ρ between u and v (since 21 / uρ λ σ= ): if  0ρ =  then there is not endogenous selection in 
the equation (once controlling also for observable covariates) while, on the contrary, if 0ρ ≠  there 
                                                                    
30 The estimation procedure of this model is very close to that of section 3.4.  
31 Remember, again, that the standard errors of parameters have to be corrected for the generated regressors.  
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is  endogenous selection and the sign of ρ  shows if participation and outcome are positively or 
negatively correlated. Since this methodology is fully parametric a maximum likelihood approach 
can be used to estimate consistently all the parameters.  
The specification of the two equation in system [37] depends on the theory the analyst has in 
mind: different specifications can produce substantial different estimations of the subsidy parameter; 
in this sense, this model is more flexible even though less robust than matching or OLS estimations. 
Nevertheless, it is always possible to compare these methods by holding 
x z matching covariates= = ; in this way we reduce any arbitrariness in choosing different sets of x 
of z and a comparison among these methods becomes possible32. 
6. AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT WHEN A LONGITUDINAL DATASET IS AVAILABLE 
Thus far, apart from section 3.6, we have taken into account estimation methods only in a cross-
section data structure. Nevertheless, the availability of a longitudinal dataset can convey additional 
insights and estimation improvements into two directions: 1. in the possibility of taking into account 
unobservable elements (such as specific firm ability, and so on) through, for example, a fixed effect 
estimation (FE) that allows, at least partially, to reconcile OLS estimation with “selection on 
unobservables” (without introducing, for example, “ad hoc” instrumental variables); 2. in the 
possibility of exploiting data for a dynamic analysis of subsidy effectiveness, by drawing on a 
dynamic treatment approach otherwise impossible to do in a cross-section setting.  
In what follows we first present the difference-in-differences (DID) estimator and its properties 
(section 6.1) to go on by extending it in a dynamic treatment setting (section 6.2 and 6.3); finally, in 
section 6.4 we provide a comparison between the FE and the DID estimator of the effect of public 
support on business R&D effort.   
6.1 The difference-in-differences (DID) estimator 
When a panel dataset is available we can observe the same firm before and after it receives a 
subsidy33. Suppose to have two times, t0 and t1, and that the subsidy occurs in between them, say, at τ 
so that: t0  < τ <  t1. In t0 the firm hasn’t received any subsidy, whereas in  t1 it is already treated. The 
firm i’s gain in t1 after having been treated in t0 is defined as:  
 
1 1 1
1 0
, , ,i t i t i tR RΔ = −  
 
where 
1
0
,i tR is the level of R&D expenditure of the firm in t1 , had it not received any subsidy in t0. It 
is quite clear that 
1
0
,i tR  is non observable and represent, as in the case of the cross-section setting, 
the missing counterfactual: again in each t, we only can observe a firm in a given status.  
We define, in this new context, the ATET as: 
 
1 1 0 1 1 0
1 0
, , , , , ,( | 1, 0) ( | 1, 0)i t i t i t i t i t i tE R w w E R w wα = = = − = =  
 
where, compared to a cross-section setting, we have imposed the condition 
0, 0i tw = , that means we 
want to know the average treatment effect on the sub-group of firms that was not treated in t0 but 
                                                                    
32 For an extension of this selection model in a non-parametric environment see Hussinger (2003).  
33 This section is based on the mathematical appendix of the work by Lach (2000). 
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becomes treated in t1. This average, for the problem of missing counterfactual, is not known and has 
to be estimated.   
A possible idea could be that of calculating separately the average outcome of firms treated in  t1 , 
the average outcome of firms non-treated in t1, and then make the difference. By calling this estima-
tor as α1 we get: 
 
        
1 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 0
1 1 0 1
1 , , , , , ,
1 0 0
, , , , , , , , ,
0
, , ,
0 0
, , , ,
( | 1, 0) ( | 0, 0)
( | 1, 0) [ ( | 1, 0) ( | 1, 0)]
( | 0, 0)
[ ( | 1, 0) ( |
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
E R w w E R w w
E R w w E R w w E R w w
E R w w
E R w w E R w
α
α
= = = − = = =
= = = + = = − = =
− = = =
= + = = −
1 0, ,0, 0)].i t i tw= =144444444442444444444443
 
From this relation we can observe that 1α α=  if and only if the underscored quantity is null: 
 
1 1 0 1 1 0
0 0
, , , , , ,( | 1, 0) ( | 0, 0)i t i t i t i t i t i tE R w w E R w w= = = = =  
 
that is, “if the missing counterfactual 
1 1 0
0
, , ,( | 1, 0)i t i t i tE R w w= =  can be thought to be equal to the 
observable quantity 
1 1 0
0
, , ,( | 0, 0)i t i t i tE R w w= = ”; this is, in other word, a ceteris paribus condition.  
As in the cross-section case in a randomized setting the previous equality always hold since w is 
independent of the outcomes: in this case no bias exists and the sample counterpart of α1 will be a 
consistent estimator of α.  
In a non-randomized setting we can introduce, as we did before, the hypothesis of selection on 
observable, so that: 
 
1 1 0 1 1 0
0 0
, , , , , ,( | , 1, 0) ( | , 0, 0)i t i t i t i t i t i tE R x w w E R x w w= = = = =  
 
that is the equivalent version of condition [34] in the cross-section setting. 
We can now proceed to the estimation of α under selection on observable using the usual regres-
sion methods. Indeed, according to Lach (2000), we can derive the so-called Difference-In-
Differences (DID) estimator for the effect of government subsidy on R&D expenditure in a panel 
data setting (in our case the α).  
Suppose to have two R&D expenditure equations for supported and non-supported firms at t of 
this kind: 
 
[39]           
0 0
1 1
it it it
it it i it
R x
R x
β ε
β δ ε
⎧ ′= +⎪⎨ ′= + +⎪⎩
 
 
where x are assumed uncorrelated with both the error terms: 0 1( | ) ( | ) 0E x E xε ε= = . As usually, we 
can derive the following switching regression: 
 
[40]                       1 0 1 0 0(1 ) ( )it it it it it it it i it it itR w R w R x wβ δ ε ε ε′= + − = + + − + , 
 
which is a regression model characterized by a random coefficient for the regressor wit. This model 
allows for a different effect of subsidy across firms ( iδ ) and time ( 1 0it itε ε− ).  
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Assume now that 1 0it it itvε ε− =  and i i iδ δ μ= + , then equation [40] becomes: 
 
[41]                      
0
0
, 1
0
( )
[ ( | , 1, 0)]
it it it i it it i it
it it it it i it i it it i t
it it it it
R x w w v
x w w v E v x w w
x w
β δ ε η
β δ ε η η
β δ ε ω
−
′= + + + + =
′= + + + + − + = = =
′= + + +
%
%
 
 
where: 
 
      , 1
, 1
( | , 1, 0)
[ ( | , 1, 0)].
i it it i t
it it i it i it it i t
E v x w w
w v E v x w w
δ δ η
ω η η
−
−
= + + = =
= + − + = =
%
 
 
If we hold 0it it ituε ω+ =  into [41], we get: 
 
[42]               it it it itR x w uβ δ′= + +%  
 
that is, the standard regression used to measure the impact of w on R. In particular we need to know 
what δ%  measures exactly. We have seen that the average treatment effect on treated (ATET) in this 
context is: 
 
   1 0 , 1( | , 1, 0)it it it i tE R R x w wα −= − = = . 
 
Now, by taking expectations on [39], we obtain: 
 
1 0
, 1 , 1
, 1
( | , 1, 0) ( | , 1, 0)
( | , 1, 0)
it it it i t i it it i t
i it it i t
E R R x w w E v x w w
E x w w
α δ
δ δ η δ
− −
−
= − = = = + = = =
= + + = = = %  
 
showing that δ%  is measuring the treatment effect on treated (ATET), conditional on x. Observe that, 
by construction, itω  in [41] is mean independent of  wit, so the only possible correlation between the 
error term and the subsidy can be due to the correlation between 0itε  and  wit. Therefore a sufficient 
condition for OLS consistency in equation [41] is that, conditional on x and wi,t-1 = 1, 0itε  and  wit  
have to be mean independent.  
Given these premises, we could assume that the potential correlation between 0itε  and  wit  is due 
to firm specific characteristics, as well as a time specific component; it leads to the following error 
component specification in [42]: 
 
            with     E( ) 0it i t it itu θ λ η η= + + =  
 
that yields the following (system) fixed effects specification: 
 
[43]     
, 1 0
it it it i t it
i t
R x w
w
β α θ λ η
−
′= + + + +⎧⎪⎨ =⎪⎩
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where the essential difference with customary fixed effects models is that here we condition on  
, 1 0i tw − = , i.e., we only consider, for estimation, the sub-sample of firms not receiving any support in 
t-1.  
To estimate consistently α in system [43] we can take first differences of this equation, getting: 
 
[44]                  it it it t itR x wβ α λ η′Δ = Δ + + Δ + Δ  
 
where (a) the firm specific effect has been dropped out by differencing, and (b) 
, 1it it i t itw w w w−Δ = − = . By taking expectations  on equation [44], it follows that: 
 
[45]               1 1
1 1
( | , 1, 0) ( | , 0, 0)
( | , 1, 0) ( | , 0, 0)
it it it it it it it it
it it it it it it it it
E R x w w E R x w w
E x w w E x w wα η η
− −
− −
Δ Δ = = − Δ Δ = = =
+ Δ Δ = = − Δ Δ = =  
 
that is, we can consistently estimate α by taking the difference of the difference between t and t-1 in 
the R&D performance of treated and non-treated units, as long as:  
 
1 1( | , 1, 0) ( | , 0, 0)it it it it it it it itE x w w E x w wη η− −Δ Δ = = = Δ Δ = =  
 
occurring when itηΔ  is mean independent of itw (conditional on the observable itxΔ ). If this 
condition is supposed to hold, then: 
 
1 1( | , 1, 0) ( | , 0, 0)it it it it it it it itE R x w w E R x w wα − −= Δ Δ = = − Δ Δ = =  
 
whose “sample version” is the exactly the so called difference-in-differences (DID) estimator: 
 
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
, 1 1 , 1 11 1 0 0
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1ˆ [ ( )] [ ( )] [ ( )] [ ( )]
N N N N
DID it t i t t it t i t t
i i i i
R x R x R x R x
N N N N
α − − − −
= = = =
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= − − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
 
or, more compactly:  
 
1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1ˆ [  ( ) ( )] [   ( ) ( )]DID t t t t t t t tR x R x R x R xα − − − −= − − −  
 
that is equivalent to: 
 
1 0
1 0
1 1 0 0
, 1 1 , 1 11 0
1 1
1 0 1 0
1 0
1 1
1 1ˆ [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]
1 1          [ ] [ ] .
N N
DID it t i t t it t i t t
i i
N N
it it it it
i i
R x R x R x R x
N N
R R R R
N N
α − − − −
= =
= =
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= − − − =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥Δ − Δ = Δ − Δ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
 
 
From this last relation we get that: 
 
1 0ˆ 0          DID it itR Rα > ⇔ Δ > Δ  
 
i.e., we have additionality when the average difference in the treated R&D performance between t 
and t-1 (that is, after and before subsidy) is greater than that of non-treated firms.  
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6.2 Extending the difference-in-differences (DID) in a dynamic treatment setting34 
So far, we have dealt with a very simplified setting in which the event “being treated” for the firm i 
corresponds to the following condition: 
 
{ }11| 0it itw w −= = . 
 
Nevertheless, the fact to have access to a longitudinal structure of data allows us for inquiring into 
more complex treatment designs; for example, the event “being treated” can be generalized to this 
event: 
 { }, 1 , 2 , , 11, 1, 1,..., 1| 0it i t i t i t q i t qw w w w w− − − − −= = = = =  
 
in which a firm is treated if it receive a subsidy in t, t-1, …, t-q, while receiving any supports in t-q-1.    
Suppose, for the sake of simplicity, to fix q=1; in this the case the event “being treated” gets { }1 21, 1| 0it it itw w w− −= = =  and system [43] can be written as: 
 
[46]           1 2 , 1
, 2 0
it it i t it
i t
R w w
w
α α η−
−
= + +⎧⎪⎨ =⎪⎩
 
 
where we omit covariates x and fixed effects in order to simplify notation (without any lack of 
generality). If we rewrite [46] delayed of one lag, and by substituting the condition , 2 0i tw − = , we 
obtain: 
 
[47]            , 1 1i t it itR wα η− = +  
 
that subtracted to the first equation of system [46] provides: 
 
, 1 1 2 1 , 1 , 1( ) ( )it i t it i t it i tR R w wα α α η η− − −− = + − + −  
  
that is tantamount to: 
 
[48]             1 2 1 , 1( )it it i t itR w wα α α η−Δ = + − + Δ , 
 
that is equivalent to [44], but this time for the treatment event { }1 21, 1| 0it it itw w w− −= = = . 
Which is the available counterfactual for this model? In other words, how can we generalize the DID 
estimator for this specific design? In the first setting we saw that the event “being treated” was: 
 
{ }11| 0it itw w −= =  
 
and the corresponding event “not being treated” was unique and equal to: 
 
{ }10 | 0it itw w −= =  
                                                                    
34 This section and the next ones on dynamic tretment provide author’s original analyses.  
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and the DID estimator was equal to the fixed effect estimate of α in equation [43] using only the 
observations for which , 1 0i tw − = . 
In the new setting, associated to the “being treated” event: 
 
{ }1 21, 1| 0it it itw w w− −= = =  
 
we have now “four” counterfactual events, i.e., four “not-being treated” events: 
 
1. { }1 20, 1| 0it it itw w w− −= = = : and in this case 1α α=  
 
2. { }1 21, 0 | 0it it itw w w− −= = = : and in this case 2 1α α α= −  
 
3. { }1 20, 0 | 0it it itw w w− −= = = : and in this case 2α α=  
 
4. { }1 21, 1| 0it it itw w w− −= = = : and in this case 0α = . 
 
Proving this result is easy, and follow the same procedure used to arrive at equation [45]; only for 
conciseness, we prove the case 1. (the others can be obtained in the same manner). 
First, take the equation [48], and calculate: 
 
1 2 2 1 2( | 1, 1, 0) ( | 1, 1, 0)it it it it it it it itE R w w w E w w wα η− − − −Δ = = = = + Δ = = = ; 
 
then calculate: 
 
1 2 2 1 1 2( | 0, 1, 0) ( | 0, 1, 0)it it it it it it it itE R w w w E w w wα α η− − − −Δ = = = = − + Δ = = = . 
 
From [45] we saw that: 
 
1 2 1 2
2 1 2 2 1 1 2
1 1 2 1 2
( | 1, 1, 0) ( | 0, 1, 0)
( | 1, 1, 0) [ ( | 0, 1, 0)]
[ ( | 1, 1, 0) ( | 0, 1, 0)]
it it it it it it it it
it it it it it it it it
it it it it it it it it
E R w w w E R w w w
E w w w E w w w
E w w w E w w w
α
α η α α η
α η η
− − − −
− − − −
− − − −
= Δ = = = − Δ = = =
= + Δ = = = − − + Δ = = = =
= + Δ = = = − Δ = = =
 
  
so that, under mean independence between itηΔ  and 1( ; )it itw w −  and again conditional on covariates 
(non reported for simplicity), we obtain: 
1α α= . 
 
Observe that, to reach this results, we need the mean independence between itηΔ  and 1( ; )it itw w − , 
that is, we need that itw  to be predetermined for itηΔ .  
The estimation procedure can follow this scheme: 
 
a) estimate regression 1 2 , 1it il it i t i t itR x w wβ α α θ λ η−′= + + + + +  by an FE estimation and obtain 
consistent estimate 1ˆ
FEα  and 2ˆ FEα  (and, ˆ FEβ , of course); 
b) calculate the DID estimators according to the three counterfactual settings: 
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case 1:  1ˆ ˆ
I
DIDα α= ; 
case 2:  2 1ˆ ˆ ˆ
II
DIDα α α= − ; 
case 3:  2ˆ ˆ
III
DIDα α= . 
 
Apart from the fourth case (that is not interesting since DID is zero by definition), we have now 
three DID estimators (rather than only one, as in the first setting) that can be used to test 
additionality due to treatment with three potential “control” behaviors. For example: ˆ IDIDα  measures 
the additionality of firms receiving a subsidy in t-1 and t (had they received nothing in t-2) with 
firms receiving a subsidy in t-1 while receiving no subsidy in t (but had they also received nothing in 
t-2), and so on. Table 2 clarifies all possibilities.  
 
 
TABLE 2. THE DID ESTIMATORS ACCORDING TO THE FOUR COUNTERFACTUAL  
SETTINGS OCCURRING WHEN SUBSIDY CAN BE RECEIVED IN t AND t-1 
wit  
Non-supported (0) Supported (1) 
Non-supported (0) α 2 α2  – α1 wi,t-1 Supported (1) α1 0 
 
 
If q = 2 the event “being treated” takes the following form: 
 
{ }1 2 31, 1, 1| 0it it it itw w w w− − −= = = =  
 
where now we are allowing for three consecutive years of treatment, in the sub-sample of firms 
without not receiving any subsidy in t-3. In this case: 
 
1 2 1 , 1 3 2 , 2( ) ( )it it i t i t itR w w wα α α α α η− −Δ = + − + − + Δ  
 
and we can calculate, by adopting the same procedure as before, the 12q+  (in this case eight) DID 
estimators corresponding to the 12q+  counterfactual settings we may identifies. Table 3 shows the 
results. 
 
 
TABLE 3. THE DID ESTIMATORS ACCORDING TO THE EIGHT COUNTERFACTUAL 
SETTINGS OCCURRING WHEN SUBSIDY CAN BE RECEIVED IN t, t-1 AND t-2 
Counterfactual wit wit-1 wit-2 α 
1 0 1 1 α1 
2 0 0 1 α2 
3 0 1 0 α3 – α2 + α1 
4 0 0 0 α3 
5 1 1 1 0 
6 1 0 1 α2 - α1 
7 1 1 0 α3 – α2 
8 1 0 0 α3 – α1 
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Also in this case we can get various kinds of additionality according to the different settings and 
after estimating the various α. Again, for consistency, we have to assume w to be predetermined for 
itηΔ . 
6.3 Extension to more complex treatment designs: a note 
In the foregone section we have assumed the “being treated” event to be identified by:  
 
[49]            { }, 1 , 2 , , 11, 1, 1,..., 1| 0it i t i t i t q i t qw w w w w− − − − −= = = = =  
 
and we showed how to get consistent estimations of DID associated to the various counterfactual 
settings.    
Nevertheless, event [49] is only one possibility we have to identify treatment dynamically; an 
other way, indeed, is that of conditioning on more than one year of absence of treatment as in the 
following new “being treated” event: 
 { }, 1 , 2 , , 1 , 2 ,1, 1, 1,..., 1| 0, 0,..., 0it i t i t i t q i t q i t q i t q kw w w w w w w− − − − − − − − −= = = = = = = . 
 
Even in this case we can apply the procedure viewed above, although some difference can emerge 
according to the choice of conditioning events. 
6.4 A comparison between the DID and the FE estimator 
Many applications trying to explore the occurrence of additionalty in R&D supporting programs in a 
longitudinal setting, make use of a simple fixed effects (FE) estimation (eventually augmented by 
subsidy lagged variables)35. 
Which is the difference in using the FE instead of the DID estimator? Does it matter in term of es-
timate precision. Intuitively, the DID estimator should be more robust since, according to its defini-
tion, it takes into account a ceteris paribus condition that the FE estimator overlooks. To clarify this 
point we write the two regression for the DID and the FE:   
 
DID: 
, 1 0
it it it i t it
i t
R x w
w
β α θ λ η
−
′= + + + +⎧⎪⎨ =⎪⎩
 
 
   FE:  { it it it i t itR x wβ α θ λ η′= + + + +  
 
Where, by substitution and differencing we obtain (omitting  x and λ ): 
 
                                                            DID:  it it itR w α ηΔ = + Δ  
   FE :    it it itR w α ηΔ = Δ + Δ , 
 
so that we get two different conditions for consistency. For the DID equation we need that: 
 
, 1 , 1( ; ) ( ; ) ( ; ) 0it it i t it it it i tCov w Cov w Cov wη η η η− −− = − = , 
                                                                    
35 An example is the work of Klette and Møen (1998) and that of Streicher (2007). 
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that is: 
 
[50]     , 1( ; ) ( ; )it it it i tCov w Cov wη η −= ; 
 
and for the FE equation we need correspondingly: 
 
, 1 , 1 , 1
, 1 , 1 , 1
( ; ) [ ( ; ) ( ; )]
[ ( ; ) ( ; )] 0
it i t it i t it it it i t
i t i t i t it
Cov w w Cov w Cov w
Cov w Cov w
η η η η
η η
− − −
− − −
− − = −
+ − =  
 
that is: 
 
[51]        , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1[ ( ; ) ( ; )] [ ( ; ) ( ; )]it it it i t i t i t i t itCov w Cov w Cov w Cov wη η η η− − − −− = − . 
 
 
We observe immediately that, when DID is consistent (so that, [50] holds), equation [51] be-
comes: 
 
, 1 , 1 , 1[ ( ; ) ( ; )] 0i t i t i t itCov w Cov wη η− − −− = , 
 
that is: 
 
[52]              , 1 , 1 , 1( ; ) ( ; )i t i t i t itCov w Cov wη η− − −= . 
 
It means that a second and more restrictive requirement on correlations between w and η at different 
time periods is asked by the FE compared to the DID. It indicates that the condition under which the 
consistency of the DID is achieved are less restrictive of that required by the FE estimator. In this 
sense, DID is preferable to the FE estimator. 
Nevertheless, an other aspect has be taken into consideration; indeed, even if more robust than the 
FE estimator, the DID estimate reduces the number of observations needed for the estimation of α; if 
this drop in number of observations in substantial, than the estimation precision of the DID could 
decrease considerably: in other words, it could be possible to face a sort of trade-off between robust-
ness and precision making use of the DID; in particular, if the number of observations drop dramati-
cally when using the DID, it is likely that the FE estimation will produce more precise estimation 
making the DID less attractive36 (even if it could remain useful to continue to use the DID to distin-
guish between the various counterfactual settings).   
As a final remark, it is worth to put in evidence that the entire discussion we did so far about DID 
and FE can be easily applied when w is a continuous rather than binary variable. 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Although many studies aimed at measuring the effect of public support on business R&D have been 
realized and the literature continues to increase to date, much work needs to be done yet. We 
summarize some aspects that should deserve more attention in future works: 
                                                                    
36 Probably a Monte Carlo experiment could shed some light on this point. 
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– first, an aspect very little explored in the literature is the study of dynamic subsidization, an essen-
tial issue to appreciate the long-term effect of incentives; this is especially important in this field, 
since R&D activity displays its benefits along time and with substantial delays; government strat-
egy could be more targeted to long-run, rather than short-run benefits so that, without a sound 
econometric evidence on dynamic subsidization, evaluation works in this field could run the risk to 
remain very limited in terms of their predictive power and political value;   
– second, only few works take into account the complexity of mechanisms laying behind the func-
tioning of an R&D incentive programs: firm R&D and non-R&D investment strategy, market struc-
ture, macroeconomic environment, institutional and cultural factors and expectations, are only some 
of the numerous elements that could condition the effectiveness of an R&D supporting program and 
that the majority of works seem overlook;   
– third, even if the centre of the analysis of the majority of models is that of testing “private R&D ad-
ditionality” we should not forget that, on the side of society, R&D effort is only a “mean” and not 
an exclusive “end”; the very end is, more likely, that of increasing national firms’ performance such 
as productivity, profitability and degree of innovativeness (for improving standard living, economic 
growth and so on); it means that linking R&D additionality due to subsidy programs with firm per-
formances is a necessary step to provide a complete analysis of “subsidy effectiveness”; it remains 
unclear, however, how to do that without introducing more complex structural models where more 
than one variable could be potentially endogenous enlarging the estimation problems and reducing 
the feasibility and reliability of such models;      
– forth, the question of R&D support evaluation in presence of spillovers does not seem to have re-
ceived a satisfactory treatment up to now; one reason is probably tied to the difficulty of measuring 
spillovers especially those related to the provision of subsidies; for example: do subsidies generate 
“knowledge” or “rent” spillovers? And to which extent? This is still an open question; furthermore, 
even if in presence of spillovers the effect of subsidy treatment (in a counterfactual setting) can be 
seriously underestimated, we cannot rule out to generate an additional bias when a incorrect spill-
over measure is provided; in this sense what is better? Is it bearing the risk of incurring in a bias due 
to a lack of a spillover specification, or rather is it better to accept the risk of introducing a spillover 
proxy hoping this measure is sufficiently appropriate?    
– fifth, the problem of data availability is a widespread one in empirical works, ranging from the lack 
of a sound database structure (such as repeated cross-sections or longitudinal data), towards infor-
mation on the policy variable (“continuous” versus “binary” form) and knowledge on “projects 
quality”; the latter is a very important aspect since, as we underscored above, government is likely 
to choose to support firms according to three criteria: 1. the firm economic soundness, 2. the worth 
of firm proposals, 3. general indirect effect of supported projects on economy and society as a 
whole (such as, the boosting of employment, the increase in living standards, the promotion of 
technical progress, the change in industrial specialization and so on). R&D evaluation works, espe-
cially those drawing on general survey generally have rich and good information on point 1, while 
rarely can rely on information on project proposals and their quality, to not say, about the argu-
ments of the “welfare function” adopted by the government in its decision; hence it is quite clear-
cut that, although many econometric methods deal with “selection on unobservables”, the risk of 
omitting relevant variable and generating substantial biases cannot be, in any case, totally pre-
vented.   
 
By means of this review we hope to have risen probably old as well as new questions, insights and 
possible improvements for future econometric works aiming at modelling and measuring the effect 
of public support on business R&D effort.       
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